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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Dzivi: Love v. Mon-O-Co. Oil Corp.

(Vol. 20,

CIVIL PROCEDURE - VENUE - ACTIONS ON CONTRACT - Defendant entered into a written lease agreement with the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff agreed to drill an oil well for the defendant. All of the acts required
of plaintiff were to be performed in Fallon County. The contract did not
provide where payment was to be made. The defendant is a Montana corporation with its principal office in Billings, Yellowstone County. Action for
breach of contract was commenced in the District Court for Fallon County.
Defendant's motion for change of place of trial to Yellowstone County
was denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, held, affirmed.
Either the county of defendant's residence or the county where the contract was to be performed is the proper county for the trial of the action;
if the plaintiff chooses either of these counties, defendant may not have it
removed. Love v. Mon-O-Ca. Oil Corp., 319 P.2d 1056 (Mont. 1958)
(Justice Adair specially concurring).

After enumerating the proper county in which certain actions should
be tried, the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 93-2904 provides:
In all other cases the action shall be tried in the county in which
defendants, or any of them, may reside at the commencement of
the action, * * " Actions upon contracts may be tried in the
county in which the contract was to be performed, and actions
for torts in the county where the tort was committed; subject,
however, to the power of the court to change the place of trial
as provided in this code. (Emphasis added.)
In State ex rel. Interstate Lumber Co. v. District Court the contract
in question was made in Lewis and Clark County and was to be performed there. The defendant was a resident of Silver Bow County and
had obtained an order directing transfer of the cause from Lewis and
Clark County to Silver Bow County. In annulling the order, the court
said the permissive auxiliary verb may should be interpreted to mean
"must" so that the sentence becomes harmonious and consistent with the
rest of the section and thus expressive of a definite intention of the
legislature in enacting it. No valid reason was given for declaring that
the sentence would be inconsistent with the rest of the section if may
meant what is said.
The case of Hardenburghv. Hardenburgh'involved a written contract
for the sale of a certain outdoor advertising agency located in Missoula
County. Action was brought in Richland County and the defendant
moved to transfer the cause to Missoula County upon the grounds: (1)
that the defendant resided in that county at the time of commencement
of the action, and (2) that the contract was to be performed in Missoula
County. A divided court granted the motion for change of venue. Mr.
Justice Adair in his opinion expressly disapproved the holding in the
Interstate case and said, "[A] ctions on contract may also be tried in
the county in which the contract was to be performed provided that the
contract sued upon indicates, either in terms or by express implication
'54 Mont. 602, 172 Pac. 1080 (1918).
2115 Mont. 469, 146 P.2d 151 (1944).
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therefrom, a particular county in which it was to be performed other
than the county in which the defendant may reside at the commencement
of the action." ' This opinion was concurred in by Mr. Justice Anderson,
and Mr. Justice Morris concurred in the result without specifying his
reasons. Mr. Chief Justice Johnson and Mr. Justice Erickson dissented.
In separate opinions they expressed the belief that the Interstate case correctly interpreted the statute.
The county in which that action was commenced was neither the
county of the defendant's residence nor the county in which the contract
was to be performed. The defendant was therefore entitled upon demand
to have the cause removed to a proper county. Since Missoula County was
both the county in which the contract was to be performed and the county
of the defendant's residence, it was the proper county in which to try
the action under either interpretation of the performance exception. So
any position on the Interstate case was unnecessary to the decision of the
Hardenburgh case.
This area of the law was further confused by the case of Johnson
v. Ogle.' In that case, action was commenced in Lake County where the
plaintiff alleged the contract was to be performed. The defendant moved
for a change of venue to Stillwater County on the grounds that he was a
resident of that county. The court affirmed an order denying the change
of venue. In the majority opinion Mr. Justice Morris stated that his
special concurring opinion in the Hardenburgh case was not to be construed as overruling the Interstate case in any particular whatever. In
separate specially concurring opinions, Mr. Justice Adiar and Mr. Justice
Angstman referred to this attempt to clarify the holding in the Hardenburgh case as gratuitous and obiter dictum.'
In the case of Frazer v. Clark,' the majority discusses the question
of whether the contract performance exception embraced only express
contracts which on their face indicate the place of performance. The
opinion then states, "We expressly disapprove of the above construction
attempted to be given in State ex rel. Interstate Lumber Co. v. District
Court, supra, to the provisions of the second or concluding sentence of
' * R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2904."' Exactly what construction the court is
disapproving it not clear. The court in the Interstate case did not attempt to construe the exception as applicable only to express contracts.
This phase of the problem was not considered in Interstate. The court in
the Frazer case may have intended to overrule the Interstate holding
that may in the statute means "must". But the may-must controversy
was not discussed in the Fraser decision, and it seems unlikely that the
court would dismiss such a controversy so summarily.
'1d. at 488, 146 P.2d at 158.

'117 Mont. 419, 159 P.2d 337 (1945).
rMr. Justice Adair's attack on the majority opinion in the Johnson case is based

on his belief that any position on the may-must issue was unnecessary to the resut. It is interesting to note that this is apparently the same reason why Mr.

Justice Morris did not concur with the reasoning of the majority in the Hardenburgh case.
'128 Mont. 160, 273 P.2d 105 (1964).
'Id. at 187, 273 P.2d at 119.
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Although much confusion has resulted from the inconsistent decisions,' it appears that prior to the instant decision, the Interstate case
remained the leading case in construction of section 93-2904. In the
principal case the majority in reaching its decision said that the word
may in the statute should not be interpreted to mean "must," as was done
in the Interstate case. However, it should be noted that the statement
that may should mean "may" in the performance exception was perhaps
not necessary to the instant decision. The action was brought in Fallon
County, which the court determined was the place of performance of the
contract. So Fallon County would have been the only proper county
for trial of the action under the earlier Interstate holding that may in the
statute means "must". If may were given only permissive force Fallon
County would still be one of the proper counties, and denial of the motion
for a change of venue would be proper.!
The defendant's principal contention in moving for a change of
venue in the instant case was that the contracts alleged in plaintiff's
complaint failed to provide any place of performance of the defendant's
part of the contract. The burden of establishing the right to change of
venue is upon the movant. ° The plaintiff, is his affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for change of place of trial, stated that it was
agreed that payments to be made by the defendant to him were to be
made in Fallon County. This affidavit was uncontroverted. When such
an affidavit remains wholly uncontroverted, the statement of facts set
forth therein must be taken as true.' The place of performance by both
parties to the contract must then be taken as Fallon County. '
The principal question before the court was whether the place of
performance must appear in the express terms of the contract. The majority
opinion stated that the performance exception applies only to such actions
as are based upon contracts which plainly. show, either (a) by their express
terms, or (b) by necessary implication therefrom, that the contracting
parties mutually agreed at the time of contracting upon a particular
county other than that of defendant's residence, wherein they intended
that their contract was to be performed. It might be argued that this
was the only holding necessary to the decision of the instant case.
However, even if the statement in the principal case that may in the
statute means "may" is considered mere dictum, it is still clear that the
court intended to settle the controversy. Further, the reaffirmation of
this position in the case of Seifert v. Gehle," which was decided after
the principal case, should make this principal controling; i.e., that
may in the statute is permissive. The Seifert case involved a venue dispute in a tort action. The alleged tort was committed in Lincoln County
'For a more complete discussion of this confused area of Mohtana law see Notes in
10 MoNr. L. REv. 83 (1949), and 16 MONT. L. Rsv. 68 (1955).
'Under Shields v. Shields, 115 Mont. 146, 139 P.2d 528 (1943), it is error to grant a
change of venue from one proper county to another.
'Courtney v. Gordon, 74 Mont. 408, 241 Pac. 233 (1925).
'Fraser v. Clark, 128 Mont. 160, 273 P.2d 105 (1954).
"Therefore it was not necessary for the court to decide whether the place of performance of the defendant's part of the contract is controlling in resolving this
venue question.
'323 P.2d 269 (Mont. 1958).
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and the defendant was a resident of Flathead County. Action was commenced in Lake County. The Montana Supreme Court reversed an order
denying a change of venue to Flathead County. In so holding the court
said that the word may as used in section 93-2904 applies to tort actions
as well as to contract actions, and the statute means that either the county
of defendant's residence or the county where the tort was committed is
a proper county for trial of the action.
19581

The instant decision, in light of -the Seifert case, has settled two issues
regarding the proper venue in actions on contract or tort. First, may
in the contract performance exception in R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2904, means
exactly what it says. Either the county of defendant's residence or the
county where the contract was to be performed is the proper county for
trial of the action. Second, in contract actions the place of performance
need not appear in the express terms of the contract, but it may be
shown by necessary implication therefrom and the performance exception
may be invoked. The certainty so long desired in this area has at last
been established.
G. RICHARD DZIVI

EQUITY

-

APPEALS FROM

EQUITY DECREES -

SCOPE OF APPELLATE

Plaintiff wife sought a decree of separate maintenance on
grounds of mental and physical cruelty inflicted by her husband. The evidence was in sharp conflict on most points. The plaintiff's case was based
almost entirely on her own testimony, practically all of which was uncorroborated. The district court decree allowed separate maintenance. On
appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Where the evidence
in an equity case is in conflict the Supreme Court inclines toward sustaining the trial judge's findings because his personal observation of
the witnesses allows him to better evaluate their credibility. And where
there is substantial credible evidence in favor of the trial court's finding
for the plaintiff, that finding will be sustained even though some of
plaintiff's evidence be discarded as incredible. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 123
Mont. 303, 317 P.2d 856 (1957) (Justices Adair and Bottomly dissenting).'
RhvIwW-

Section 93-216, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, provides that in
equity appeals and in matters and proceedings of an equitable nature
"the supreme court shall review all questions of fact arising upon the
evidence presented in the record. . . and determine the same, as well as
questions of law." (Emphasis supplied.)" This is not unlike the English
equity procedure which had developed by the middle of the nineteenth
century. In England such a complete review of facts and law in equity
was entirely appropriate since the court of first resort neither saw nor
questioned witnesses but made its decision on the basis of written evidence.
'Plaintiff's case, since believed, satisfied the requirements for separate maintenance,
consequently this question will not be considered here. However, the facts are
interesting and highly controversial.
2
Lnws of Montana 1903, Second Extraordinary Session, eh. 1.
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